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The Committee for Economic Develop-
ment is an independent research and policy
organization of some 250 business leaders and
educators. CED is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and
nonpolitical. Its purpose is to propose policies
that bring about steady economic growth at
high employment and reasonably stable prices,
increased productivity and living standards,
greater and more equal opportunity for every
citizen, and an improved quality of life for all. 
All CED policy recommendations must have
the approval of Trustees on the Research and
Policy Committee. This committee is directed
under the bylaws, which emphasize that “all
research is to be thoroughly objective in char-
acter, and the approach in each instance is to
be from the standpoint of the general welfare
and not from that of any special political or
economic group.” The committee is aided by a
Research Advisory Board of leading social sci-
entists and by a small permanent professional
staff. 
The Research and Policy Committee does
not attempt to pass judgment on any pending
specific legislative proposals; its purpose is to
urge careful consideration of the objectives set
forth in this statement and of the best means of
accomplishing those objectives. 
Each statement is preceded by extensive dis-
cussions, meetings, and exchange of memo-
randa. The research is undertaken by a sub-
committee, assisted by advisors chosen for their
competence in the field under study. 
The full Research and Policy Committee
participates in the drafting of recommenda-
tions. Likewise, the trustees on the drafting
subcommittee vote to approve or disapprove a
policy statement, and they share with the
Research and Policy Committee the privilege
of submitting individual comments for publica-
tion. 
The recommendations presented herein are those
of the Trustee members of the Research and Policy
Committee and the responsible subcommittee. They
are not necessarily endorsed by other Trustees or by
nontrustee subcommittee members, advisors, contrib-
utors, staff members, or others associated with CED.
iv
RESPONSIBILITY FOR CED STATEMENTS 
ON NATIONAL POLICY 
Co-Chairmen
PATRICK W. GROSS
Chairman, The Lovell Group
Founder and Senior Advisor
American Management Systems, Inc.
BRUCE K. MACLAURY
President Emeritus
The Brookings Institution
Vice Chairmen
IAN ARNOF
Retired Chairman
Bank One, Louisiana, N.A.
CLIFTON R. WHARTON, JR.
Former Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer 
TIAA-CREF
REX D. ADAMS
Professor of Business Administration 
The Fuqua School of Business
Duke University
ALAN BELZER
Retired President and Chief Operating 
Officer
AlliedSignal Inc.
PETER A. BENOLIEL
Chairman, Executive Committee
Quaker Chemical Corporation
ROY J. BOSTOCK
Chairman Emeritus, Executive
Committee
Bcom3 Group, Inc.
FLETCHER L. BYROM
President and Chief Executive Officer
MICASU Corporation
DONALD R. CALDWELL
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Cross Atlantic Capital Partners
JOHN B. CAVE
Principal
Avenir Group, Inc.
CAROLYN CHIN
Chairman
Commtouch/C3 Partners
A. W. CLAUSEN
Retired Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer
BankAmerica Corporation
JOHN L. CLENDENIN
Retired Chairman 
BellSouth Corporation
GEORGE H. CONRADES 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Akamai Technologies, Inc.
RONALD R. DAVENPORT
Chairman of the Board
Sheridan Broadcasting Corporation
JOHN DIEBOLD
Chairman
John Diebold Incorporated
FRANK P. DOYLE
Retired Executive Vice President
General Electric
T.J. DERMOT DUNPHY
Chairman
Kildare Enterprises, LLC
CHRISTOPHER D. EARL
Managing Director
Perseus Capital, LLC
W. D. EBERLE
Chairman
Manchester Associates, Ltd.
EDMUND B. FITZGERALD
Managing Director
Woodmont Associates
HARRY L. FREEMAN
Chair
The Mark Twain Institute
BARBARA B. GROGAN
President 
Western Industrial Contractors
RICHARD W. HANSELMAN
Chairman 
Health Net Inc.
RODERICK M. HILLS
Chairman
Hills Enterprises, Ltd.
MATINA S. HORNER
Executive Vice President
TIAA-CREF
H.V. JONES
Managing Director
Korn/Ferry International
EDWARD A. KANGAS
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer,
Retired 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
JOSEPH E. KASPUTYS
Chairman, President and Chief
Executive Officer
Global Insight, Inc.
CHARLES E.M. KOLB
President
Committee for Economic Development
CHARLES R. LEE
Chairman 
Verizon Communications
ALONZO L. MCDONALD
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Avenir Group, Inc.
NICHOLAS G. MOORE
Chairman Emeritus
PricewaterhouseCoopers
STEFFEN E. PALKO 
Vice Chairman and President
XTO Energy Inc.
CAROL J. PARRY 
President
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Associates
VICTOR A. PELSON
Senior Advisor 
UBS Warburg LLC
PETER G. PETERSON
Chairman 
The Blackstone Group
NED REGAN
President
Baruch College
JAMES Q. RIORDAN
Chairman
Quentin Partners Co.
LANDON H. ROWLAND
Chairman
Janus Capital Group
GEORGE RUPP
President
International Rescue Committee
ROCCO C. SICILIANO
Beverly Hills, California
MATTHEW J. STOVER 
President
LKM Ventures
ARNOLD R. WEBER
President Emeritus
Northwestern University
JOSH S. WESTON
Honorary Chairman
Automatic Data Processing, Inc.
DOLORES D. WHARTON
Former Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer
The Fund for Corporate Initiatives, Inc.
MARTIN B. ZIMMERMAN
Group Vice President, Corporate 
Affairs
Ford Motor Company
v
RESEARCH AND POLICY COMMITTEE
*Voted to approve the policy statement but submitted memoranda of comment, reservation, or dissent, See page 41
American Workers and Economic Change, 1996
FRANK P. DOYLE
Chair, Subcommittee on U.S. Immigration Policy
Retired Executive Vice President
General Electric Company
America’s Basic Research: Prosperity Through
Discovery, 1998
GEORGE H. CONRADES
Chair, Subcommittee on Sustaining American Basic 
Research
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Akamai Technologies, Inc.
The Digital Economy: Promoting Competition,
Innovation, and Opportunity, 2001
IRWIN DORROS
Co-Chair, Subcommittee on Electronic Commerce
President
Dorros Associates
ELLEN R. MARRAM
Co-Chair, Subcommittee on Electronic Commerce 
Partner
North Castle Partners
From Protest to Progress: Addressing Labor and
Environmental Conditions Through Freer Trade, 2001
EDMUND B. FITZGERALD
Co-Chair, Subcommittee on Globalization
Managing Director
Woodmont Associates
PAULA STERN
Co-Chair, Subcommittee on Globalization 
President
The Stern Group, Inc.
Improving Global Financial Stability, 2000
KATHLEEN B. COOPER
Co-Chair, Subcommittee on International Financial
Stabilization
Former Chief Economist and Manager, 
Economics & Energy Division
Exxon Mobil Corporation
GEORGE F. RUSSELL, JR.
Co-Chair, Subcommittee on International Financial 
Stabilization
Chairman
Sunshine Management Services, LLC
Investing the People’s Business: A Business Proposal 
for Campaign Finance Reform, 1999
EDWARD A. KANGAS
Co-Chair, Subcommittee on Campaign Finance Reform
Retired Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 
GEORGE RUPP
Co-Chair, Subcommittee on Campaign Finance Reform
President
International Rescue Committee 
Modernizing Government Regulation: The Need 
for Action, 1998
RODERICK M. HILLS
Chair, Subcommittee on Reforming the Regulatory Process
Chairman
Hills Enterprises, Ltd.
vi
A NOTE ON THIS STATEMENT
This Statement, approved by the Committee for Economic Development’s Research and Policy
Committee, is drawn from previous CED policy statements on a variety of topics.  These include:
A New Vision for Health Care: A Leadership 
Role for Business, 2002
PETER A. BENOLIEL
Co-Chair, Subcommittee on the Employer’s Role in 
Health Care
Chairman, Executive Committee
Quaker Chemical Corporation
JEROME H. GROSSMAN
Co-Chair, Subcommittee on the Employer’s Role in 
Health Care
Senior Fellow
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University 
STEFFEN E. PALKO
Co-Chair, Subcommittee on the Employer’s Role in 
Health Care
Vice Chairman and President
XTO Energy Inc.
Preschool for All: Investing in a Productive 
and Just Society, 2002
ROY J. BOSTOCK
Co-Chair, Subcommittee on Education Policy
Chairman Emeritus, Executive Committee
Bcom3 Group, Inc.
EDWARD B. RUST, JR.
Co-Chair, Subcommittee on Education Policy
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
State Farm Insurance Companies
Reforming Immigration: Helping Meet America’s Need
for a Skilled Workforce, 2001
CHRISTOPHER D. EARL
Co-Chair, Subcommittee on U.S. Immigration Policy
Managing Director
Perseus Capital, LLC
H.V. JONES
Co-Chair, Subcommittee on U.S. Immigration Policy 
Managing Director
Korn/Ferry International
Restoring Prosperity: Budget Choices for Economic
Growth, 1992
JOSH S. WESTON
Chair, Subcommittee on the Federal Budget and 
Economic Growth
Honorary Chairman
Automatic Data Processing, Inc.
A Shared Future: Reducing Global Poverty, 2002
EDMUND B. FITZGERALD
Co-Chair, Subcommittee on Globalization
Managing Director
Woodmont Associates
PAULA STERN
Co-Chair, Subcommittee on Globalization 
President
The Stern Group, Inc.
Welfare Reform and Beyond: Making Work Work, 2000
REX D. ADAMS
Co-Chair, Subcommittee on Business, Welfare Reform, and 
the Low-Wage Labor Market
Professor of Business Administration
The Fuqua School of Business
Duke University
MATINA S. HORNER
Co-Chair, Subcommittee on Business, Welfare Reform, and 
the Low-Wage Labor Market
Executive Vice-President
TIAA-CREF
vii
CED has, over the six decades of its exis-
tence, commented frequently and forcefully
on various policies that concern the nation’s
prospects for economic growth. But it has
never tied together these efforts into a single
volume regarding how the economy grows
and, more generally, what must be done to
improve its long-term prospects.
Understanding how the economy grows
and how it raises our standard of living has
never been more important. Our nation now
debates a range of issues related to growth —
from the fiscal deficit to corporate gover-
nance, to the influence of trade, technology,
and immigration. How do all these issues fit
together? How do they influence future 
generations’ prospects for success?
This document seeks to link these issues
together — to provide that “story of growth”
— built on the three themes of invention,
investment, and reorganization — in a fashion
the average, non-technical reader will find
convenient and accessible. It refers, when rele-
vant, to previous CED work and recommenda-
tions on the topics it presents. The reader is
encouraged to consult these statements for
more detailed analysis and discussion of 
these issues.
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THE PURPOSE OF THIS STATEMENT
Economic growth is the force that drives
almost all aspects of American society. Beyond
its contribution to higher standards of living,
economic growth enables the nation to
accommodate change more readily, to be
more tolerant and inclusive, to feel more con-
fident playing a leadership role in the world,
to invest in the future, and to achieve a variety
of other goals. Moreover, the expectation of
sustained growth is built into our institutions
and beliefs; our society is premised in many
regards on the assumption that growth will
allow personal and intergenerational mobility
and will support a meritocratic and entrepre-
neurial society. This, in turn, will encourage
the investment, risk-taking, and values that
reinforce growth.
In the sixty years of its existence, the
Committee for Economic Development
(CED) has been primarily concerned with
promoting the institutions and policies that
will support economic growth and equitably
distribute its gains. This central goal has led it
into many different policy areas, from the ini-
tial formulation of the Marshall Plan, to its
ongoing support for expanded world trade, to
its commitment to quality education for all, to
its leading role in campaign finance reform. 
The breadth of CED’s agenda reflects, in
turn, the diverse origins of economic growth.
The sources of American economic growth
have varied with the economy’s stage of devel-
opment and historical setting. Yet there are
important common themes across all these
periods. Indeed, this report argues that eco-
nomic growth has its roots in indentifiable 
factors, most of which are long-term in nature;
a faster rate of long-term economic growth is
the result of specific aspects of the economy
and society working well over sustained 
periods of time. 
1
Chapter 1
On Economic Growth
CED’S MISSION
The purpose of CED “…is to develop,
through objective research and informed 
discussions, findings and recommendations
for private and public policy that will 
contribute to preserving and strengthening
our free society, achieving steady economic
growth at high employment and reasonably
stable prices, increasing productivity and 
living standards, providing greater and
more equal opportunity for every citizen,
and improving the quality of life for all.” 
SOURCE: Committee for Economic Development, 
By-Laws, revised 1999, p. 8
THE MARSHALL PLAN
“We…recommend that the United States
should undertake a broad program of 
economic cooperation with Western Europe.
We believe that American cooperation is
needed to accomplish two things:  
1) Relief to tide Western Europe over 
its present distress and allow it time to
accomplish the necessary expansion of 
production; 2) Help in the rebuilding and
development necessary to reknit the 
economic fabric of Europe.…”
SOURCE: Committee for Economic Development, An
American Program of European Economic Cooperation
(New York, NY: Committee for Economic Development,
1948), pp.10-11
Economists have developed many insights
into the process of economic growth, but their
understandings do not inform the public
debate. The focus of the nation’s economic
policy debate is too often placed on short-
term phenomena. The Federal Reserve’s mon-
etary policy takes effect by changing short-
term market conditions. Budget and tax 
policy changes are too often implemented
without consideration of their long-term
effects. Trade policy, while theoretically
geared to long-term liberalization, is often
intended to ameliorate short-term adjustment
effects. Public-sector investments are often
underfunded due to the mismatch between
the short-term nature of their costs and the
longer-term nature of their payoffs. In all of
these cases, when seen from the perspective of
long-term growth, the horizons of the 
economic policy debate are unduly and often
counterproductively short.
This policy myopia is widely shared.
Households continually demonstrate short-
sightedness by undersaving. The financial
media find short-term policy stories and 
anecdotes more dramatic than far more
important long-term trends. CEOs focus on
the next quarter’s “bottom line,” and investors
look to quarterly results to allocate their stock
portfolios. The political process is too often
caught in an endless cycle of fund-raising and
campaigning that makes long-term considera-
tions a casualty. Moreover, growth is hard to
“appropriate;” a higher rate of growth will cre-
ate benefits, but they will be broadly dispersed
in the future, and we cannot know today who
will receive them. And policies that foster
growth may impose short-term transition 
costs on specific groups that lead them to
obstruct those policies politically (trade liber-
alization is a frequent example). Thus, even
though the benefits of growth will be widely
shared, there is no dedicated “interest group”
that speaks on behalf of this broad economic
future. 
The Committee for Economic Develop-
ment (CED), therefore, has produced this 
volume to be such a “voice for growth” and 
to provide the public with a coherent descrip-
tion of the process that leads to economic
growth. As the paper lays out this story, it will
recap relevant positions CED has taken over
the years. Its purpose is to bring CED’s views
on the “story of economic growth” into a 
single volume that will enable the public to
better understand many of today’s critical 
economic policy issues.
CONCEPTS OF GROWTH
When discussing “economic growth,” some
important distinctions must be made at the 
outset.
Increasing Long-Term Productive
Capacity Versus Using More of Existing
Capacity 
“Economic growth” as commonly used can
mean either of two very different things. It
can mean increases in the productive capacity
of the economy, which occur gradually over
many years. Or it can mean increases in the
actual level of economic activity, such as sharp
rebound from a recession or the slowing of
activity near a business cycle peak, which are
generally viewed in a shorter time frame. In
this discussion of the sources of long-term liv-
ing standards, we are concerned with the first
concept and use the term “growth” to 
discuss the economy’s long-term potential.
Economists take the economy’s “potential”
rate of growth to mean a rate roughly equiva-
lent to the maximum rate at which the econo-
my can grow without producing significant
inflation. The economy’s actual growth record
reflects both its potential and the extent to
which that potential has been realized. An
economy may fall short of its potential for sig-
nificant periods of time because of “negative
shocks” such as oil price spikes or natural dis-
asters, because its fiscal or monetary policies
are flawed, or because it has regulations, busi-
ness practices, or traditions that encumber its
performance.
An economy’s ability to operate near its
potential is obviously important. The prob-
2
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lems created by inappropriate fiscal or mone-
tary policies can be catastrophic; the Great
Depression is an example of the failure of eco-
nomic policy rather than a collapse of the
economy’s potential to grow. The quality of
fiscal, monetary, or regulatory policies has an
obvious impact on the long-term standard of
living. But how do these policies promote or
inhibit increases in productivity? What are the
intervening or underlying steps? These are the
subject of this report.
Total Income, “Per Capita” Income, 
and Productivity
There are two ways to measure economic
growth — as growth in aggregate output, or
on a per capita basis. Aggregate growth is
helpful in its own right; even if economic out-
put grows only as fast as the population, it
allows growing human needs to be met. But a
higher standard of living and all it entails
requires more income and output per capita.
Per capita income can grow for various rea-
sons. For example, if a larger proportion of
the adult population were to take jobs, output
would grow faster than population. And, in
fact, per capita income would rise, as more
families would add a second income-earner,
for example. This is precisely what happened
in the late 1970s and 1980s, when many of the
baby boom age group and female workers
entered the labor force.
But this kind of improvement is bounded
— only so many people, to use the example,
will be able to work. The real key to long-term
growth is productivity, or output per worker.
Only higher levels of activity per worker can
sustain long-term improvements in the stan-
dard of living.
Measured Growth Versus “Welfare” 
Another important distinction to be made 
is between growth and human welfare, or well-
being. For example, many activities that 
contribute to people’s well-being — from
homemaking and parenting work to knowing
that the environment or species diversity has
been preserved for future generations — are
not included in market-based measures such
as Gross Domestic Product. Moreover, while
growth is “good” for all of the reasons cited
above, it can also have negative consequences
— such as environmental degradation, social
inequality, sprawl, or reduced public amenities
— if it is not accomplished on the right terms.
And, as Robert Kennedy once famously coun-
seled, measures such as Gross Domestic
Product do not allow for the health of our
children or the joy of their play, but do count
the locks we place on our doors and the jails
we build for those who break those locks.1
Thus, while growth is to be desired, it must
always be evaluated in a fuller context.
3
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One way to understand how economies
grow is to consider them on their simplest
terms. For example, consider an economy in
which there are only a few activities: people
can either dig ditches (say, for purposes of
irrigation), haul water out of the ditches, or
plant food trees that are irrigated by the ditch-
es. The ditch-diggers each have a shovel, the
water-haulers a bucket, and the tree planters a
shoulder bag for seeds. On their way home,
people pick food from the trees, eat it 
contentedly, and rise the next day to return 
to work.
How does such a society become “better
off,” that is, become more productive? The
ditch diggers can learn how to configure the
ditch, the water-bearers can determine the
fastest rate at which they can haul water with-
out fatiguing, and the tree planters how to
best space the seedlings to get them to grow.
But sooner or later, these “tricks” will be mas-
tered and these sources of improvement
tapped out.†
There is, however, one way a sustainable
improvement could be readily obtained — by
using a backhoe. But in order for a backhoe
to raise the standard of living of our simple 
economy, several things have to happen. First,
somebody must invent it. Second, somebody
must be willing to put the backhoe in place —
there must be investment accompanying the
invention. Third and finally, there must be 
reorganization once the backhoe is put to use
— the ditch diggers must be replaced and the
way ditch-digging is organized must change.
In fact, these three steps summarize the
growth process: invention, investment, and reor-
ganization. Taken together, they are the central
elements of the process by which long-term
improvements in the standard of living occur.
Moreover, these three elements are all interde-
pendent, in that each strand of the process
depends on the others — the presence of
invention creates opportunities for investment
and reorganization just as the ability to invest
and reorganize affects the incentives to invent.
And they are all endogenous, in that none is a
“given” in the economy.‡
INVENTION
Technological change lies at the heart of 
a sustained rise in the long-term standard 
of living. Absent changing technology,
America would still be a nation of artisans 
and mule-drivers, with a standard of living to
match. New ideas — inventions — are the
wellspring of that progress.
A member of the ditch economy inventing
a backhoe de novo would be nothing short of
miraculous, but its unlikelihood is instructive.
Inventing a backhoe requires a basis in metal-
lurgy, mechanical engineering, energy trans-
4
Chapter 2 
The Fundamentals of Growth
† This is as described in the renowned growth model developed
by Robert Solow in the 1950s. Solow found that capital accu-
mulation was far less important than technical progress in
long-term growth. Capital has “diminishing marginal returns,”
and so capital accumulation alone — in this case, buying
more trees, making more buckets, etc. — can only get the
society in the example so far. 
‡ In this sense, the growth process described here is similar to 
the “endogenous” growth models pioneered by Paul Romer
in the 1980s. In these models, technological progress was the
product of decisions made by economic actors, as opposed to
a pre-ordained given.
➫
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fer, and a variety of other areas. In fact, rather
than a stand-alone invention, a backhoe, like
any other advance, is a synthesis of previous
inventions and advances; most innovations
occur because inventors take existing compo-
nents or previous inventions and rearrange
them or add some element to produce a new
breakthrough. The automobile is a good
example of such a breakthrough, which
explains why several inventors (such as
Daimler, Benz, and Olds, and later Ford)
independently achieved it within a short peri-
od of time.  This is one of the reasons why the
social benefits of innovation exceed the private
or personal gains realized by the inventor —
because each new invention becomes part of
the mass of “components” that allow for subse-
quent inventions. In fact, economists widely
accept the idea that society undervalues 
invention because of widely-cast benefits that
inventors can not capture.2
The process of invention is based on exper-
imentation, tinkering, and incremental effort.
These require inventors to spend time and
resources on their pursuits, meaning that they
must have some incentive or compulsion to
do their work, as well as the skills and training
needed.  This raises a host of issues, all of
which will play some role in the economy’s
rate of technological progress, including the
system of intellectual property protection, the
incentives offered to researchers, the rationali-
ty with which investment in research and 
development are financed, the level of scien-
tific skills in society (and, therefore, the quali-
ty of math and science education), and other
issues.
CED has been a long-standing advocate of
investments in science and technology on a
variety of fronts. It has often discussed how
“…technology plays a critical role in productiv-
ity growth,”3 and stressed the importance of
public and private investments in technology.4
It has noted that the large social returns to
innovation make it an “extremely productive
use of taxpayers’ money.”5 But as CED has also
noted, America’s success in science and tech-
nology stems not just from spending, but from
other factors as well. These include the quality
of the entrepreneurial and competitive envi-
ronment offered to American innovators and
the availability of scientific skills in the labor
force.6 CED has also noted that the economy’s
innovative track record relies on an intellectu-
al property system that balances the ability of
innovators to profit from their work with the
ability of others to use their innovations.7
INVESTMENT
If invention and new ideas alone were to
determine economic success, then nations’
standards of living could be predicted with
confidence by the number of patents or scien-
tific Nobel Prizes they have won. But that is
not the case. The step after invention is often
“It is widely recognized that economic
growth depends upon investments in
research and technology….”
SOURCE: Committee for Economic Development,
Restoring Prosperity: Budget Choices for Economic Growth
(New York, NY: Committee for Economic Development,
1992), p. 8.
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“A principal component of the system 
that supports innovation…is protection of
intellectual property, including copyrights,
patents and trademarks.”
SOURCE: Committee for Economic Development, The
Digital Economy: Promoting Competition, Innovation, and
Opportunity (New York, NY: Committee for Economic
Development, 2001), p. 23.
“Investment is necessary for economic
growth; countries that have grown most
rapidly over long periods have devoted a
high percentage of GDP to investment in
human and physical capital.” 
Source: Committee for Economic Development,
Improving Global Financial Stability (New York, NY:
Committee for Economic Development, 2000), p. 7.
called innovation or dissemination — spread-
ing the results of inventions through the econ-
omy, or, in other words, putting inventions to
use. And the most important way this occurs is
through investment. 
Economists define investment as the acqui-
sition of “goods that help us make other
goods,” such as machine tools, computers, or
transportation or energy equipment. That 
definition, albeit entirely appropriate, leads us
to think about investment solely as a way to
accumulate wealth. 
But investment is also the primary vehicle
through which inventions or new ideas enter
the economy, because new investment gener-
ally embodies new technology. When an old
machine wears out or is ready to be scrapped,
the new one that replaces it is usually far more
advanced.8 Today’s backhoe, for example, is
more powerful, flexible, and lighter-weight
than its predecessor, with better hydraulics
than it had a decade ago. Improved quality
frequently means some kind of intelligence by
way of microelectronics — equipment such as
machine tools, material handling equipment,
or even construction equipment has sensors
and electronic controls that make the current
generation far superior to its predecessors. 
But this is only one kind of investment —
physical investment. Focusing only on this kind
of investment leads us to overlook a second
and equally important form of investment —
investment in human capital, the abilities and
skills of our people. If the ditch-digging econ-
omy were to switch to backhoes, its workers
would be challenged to learn many new skills
— starting with machine operation and
machine construction — in order to make the
investment work. Thus, physical investment and
investment in human capital are tied together,
even if the way they occur is different.
Economists have long debated the determi-
nants of physical investment. Most simply,
firms invest in search of profit, usually because
they anticipate growth, or to respond to 
innovation among their competitors. The
decision to invest, therefore, is a combination
of economic calculation and the “animal 
spirits” (as Keynes termed it) of firms. But
CED has repeatedly pointed out steps that
government could take to promote invest-
ment. The right combination of fiscal and
monetary policies can produce such incen-
tives. This can be achieved by a prudent fiscal
policy — one that aims to achieve a balanced
budget over the entire business cycle — with
an accommodating monetary policy — one
that encourages credit to be gradually expand-
ed.† Together, these can produce what econo-
mists call “crowding in,” that is, reducing gov-
ernment’s borrowing requirements and mak-
ing the funds it frees up available at a lower
cost for business purposes. This strategy was
followed to great success in the expansion 
of the 1990s. 
CED’s support for such a policy mix is
based on its recognition of the importance 
of a high rate of national saving. Saving 
creates the wherewithal to finance investment.
Domestic saving can come from one of three
sources — from household saving, from busi-
ness profits, or from government surpluses.
Several years ago, CED advocated raising the
net national savings rate (combined public
and private) to its pre-1980s level of 10 per-
cent of net national product.9 Shortly there-
after, national saving rose sharply as the feder-
al budget was briefly brought into surplus, as
seen in Figure 1. However, in 2001-2002, the
societal savings rate has declined again to a
historically low level, as Figure 1 illustrates, of
less than 3 percent. Many households appar-
ently felt that a rising stock market made it
possible not to save for retirement or other
needs. The market has now fallen, but saving
has yet to rise substantially. 
Corporate profits peaked as a share of eco-
nomic activity in 1997 and have been revised
downward in recent years as additional infor-
6
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† A “balanced budget over the business cycle” implies deficits at
the bottom of the cycle and surpluses at the top. Some econ-
omists believe, however, that this rule is not prudent enough
in the current budget content, due to large and unfunded
future obligations related to Social Security and Medicare.
Putting away resources for these needs in the next several
decades would require fiscal surpluses over the course of the
business cycle.
mation has come to light — it turns out busi-
ness was less profitable than first thought dur-
ing those years. And projections of federal
deficits have changed dramatically in recent
years as well; in the late 1990s, economists
spoke of eliminating public debt sometime in
the next few decades. Since then, anticipated
surpluses have failed to materialize. Official
projections now call for the economy to “grow
out” of its deficits later in the decade. But this
estimate does not accommodate added spend-
ing on security or homeland defense, pre-
scription drugs or other new medical care
benefits, the need to reform the alternative
minimum tax, financing universal pre-school
and education reform, and other critical
needs. Moreover, beginning at the end of this
decade, the retirement of the baby boomers
will create new spending obligations for Social
Security and government-provided health
care. Thus, there is a reasonable expectation
for sustained deficits for decades to come.
Saving alone cannot guarantee high levels
of investment, but sustained investment can-
not take place without it. In the short run, we
can borrow from foreigners, but the resulting
liabilities pose their own longer-term risks.
While a variety of specific incentives could
help spur investment, these will run at cross
purposes so long as the economy does not
generate adequate saving in the long term.
Beyond the level of investment, there is the
question of its composition. In both Japan in
the 1990s and in the U.S. telecommunications
sector today, there are signs of overinvestment,
which poses economic costs different from
those of underinvestment but nonetheless
real. The telecommunications sector boom
7
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and bust was largely investor-driven, as invest-
ment in this sector became a mania that sub-
sequently lost its luster. But investment also
can be misallocated by tax incentives or other
policies that distort resource allocation. Poor
regulatory policies led to unsound lending
practices by the savings and loan (S&L) insti-
tutions in the late 1980s, and a $124 billion
S&L bailout was the result.10 CED has also
argued that the U.S. economy overinvests in
residential housing due to its tax treatment
and has called for limitations such as eliminat-
ing the favorable tax treatment for second
homes.11
The way investment in human capital is
determined is rooted in many of the same
incentives, but has critical differences. When
firms appraise investments in physical capital,
they do so knowing that it will always be theirs.
But if firms invest in the human capital of
their workers, there is always the reality that
those workers will one day depart for other
firms and occupations, taking their new-found
skills with them. 
Thus, workers must invest in their own
skills. But given that workers often begin in
marginal economic circumstances, and that
skills, being non-transferrable and intangible,
make a poorer collateral than a physical asset,
investments in skill-building are harder to
finance than investments in physical capital.
Moreover, a higher level of human capital 
creates a more productive environment for
physical capital, hastens the development of
inventions, and allows greater social mobility.
For all of these reasons, human capital has an
element of social benefit as well as the individ-
ual benefits it generates. Thus, government
has historically played an important role in
building human capital, from providing a
public school system to subsidizing loans for
college students.
REORGANIZATION
The organization of production is often
not considered an element of the growth
process, but it is in fact an essential one. This
is particularly true when reorganization is 
considered together with invention and 
investment.
For example, return to the idea of a ditch-
digging economy. If someone were to invent a
backhoe and invest in one, its benefits could-
n’t be fully realized — or realized at all —
unless the ditch diggers were replaced by the
equipment. Otherwise, the economy would
carry the burden of a large, unproductive 
segment of its labor force — the ditch-diggers
would sit around and do nothing. Moreover,
there is now something new and more pro-
ductive for them to do — they need to make
the backhoes that will revolutionize ditch-
digging. Thus, the economy’s ability to 
reorganize itself will determine whether the
invention and investment it has undertaken
will bear fruit.
Reorganization takes place on other levels
as well. For example, let’s presume our econo-
my has “firms” — companies that dig, haul, or
plant. If so, the companies that dig ditches
will now be larger, because it’s easier to coor-
dinate the work of a few backhoes than of
hundreds of diggers. And if there are ditch-
digging companies, then the terms on which
they compete will change. The most successful
companies once were those that coordinated
their diggers. Now, they will be the ones who
most quickly bring backhoes into production.
In fact, economic research provides com-
pelling evidence that these effects occur.
Using a data set compiled by the Census
Bureau in which thousands of plants were
tracked over two decades, researchers have
noticed that innovation, reorganization, and
8
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“…We must not resist economic change….
Our only sensible course is to embrace
change and adapt to it with public and pri-
vate policies that secure its benefits while
mitigating its costs.” 
SOURCE: Committee for Economic Development,
American Workers and Economic Change (New York, NY:
Committee for Economic Development, 1996), p. 3.
growth are closely linked. Firms that bring
new technologies into production, for exam-
ple, were found to grow faster, be more prof-
itable, and have faster growing employment
than those that don’t.12 Moreover, researchers
discovered that two-thirds of the productivity
gains in manufacturing experienced over long
periods of time occurred not because individ-
ual firms became more productive, but
because higher-productivity firms grew faster
and took market share away from lower-pro-
ductivity firms.13 Taken together, these results
show that economic growth, on the one hand,
and change and displacement, on the other,
are inseparable — an economy grows when
new activities supplant old ones and more 
productive, innovative firms out-compete 
their rivals.
The same holds true in the labor market.
The economy becomes more productive when
new occupations and skills supplant old ones.
The more rigid labor markets of continental
Europe and Japan are often criticized on pre-
cisely this score. By making it difficult to move
workers from old jobs to new ones, these
economies choke off the very process of
change that allows new jobs and activities to
supplant the old. 
Displacing workers and jobs is clearly a
problem that requires a response. CED has
advocated a series of measures to facilitate
economic change by alleviating the burden on
those unprepared to respond to change and
seeking trade protection. It has called for
restructuring the unemployment insurance
program to increase coverage and long-term
benefits and for “wage insurance” that would
give interim income relief to workers whose
incomes were reduced by economic change.14
These measures respond to the need to
enfranchise all workers in the face of econo-
mic change, regardless of its source. But they
are also driven by the realization that if society
protects those who hold “old” jobs from the
forces of change, those same forces will be
unable to create “new” jobs, and the economy
will be poorer as a result.
A NOTE ON MARKETS
One problem with the ditch-digging 
economy model is that it fails to emphasize
the central role of markets. From Egyptian
pyramids to Roman aqueducts to Gothic
cathedrals, centrally-planned (non-market)
economies have produced isolated and indi-
vidual successes (usually at a social cost borne
elsewhere in their economies). But as did the
Soviet Union, they have proven themselves
unable to maintain this record of success over
the long-term. In fact, as economic activity
becomes more complex, markets become
evermore essential to the growth process. 
Markets are an ingeniously efficient way to
organize economic activity. By providing infor-
mation, through prices, to all an economy’s
participants, they allow each of those partici-
pants to make plans and choices that best suit
their needs and abilities, and by doing so,
have the potential to lead them to increase
the output and well-being society can derive
from its resources; this is the essence of Adam
Smith’s “invisible hand.”  When they do so,
they also lead competitors to innovate in
order to compete with each other, and sup-
plant less productive firms and activities with
more productive ones.
The theoretical perfection this theory
describes is impossible to achieve. In fact, mar-
kets can experience a host of problems — an
undesirable distribution of income, imperfect
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“…[The] process of resource redeployment
is essential to economic growth. In the end,
it leads to better jobs in more successful
industries and higher incomes with better
standards of living. These gains for the soci-
ety at large make it both equitable and pos-
sible to assist those displaced by economic
change.”
SOURCE: Committee for Economic Development, From
Protest to Progress: Addressing Labor and Environmental
Conditions Through Freer Trade (New York, NY:
Committee for Economic Development, 2001), p. 6.
information, monopoly, misattribution of such
effects as pollution, so-called “public goods,”
and crime or fraud. Focused efforts by govern-
ment can often correct many of these “market
failures,” although such focused and intelli-
gent efforts cannot be presumed. We address
some of these issues later in this report. 
Still, the underlying ability of markets to
direct resources is widely accepted throughout
economics. The deregulation of industries
such as transportation (both air and truck-
ing), telecommunications, and finance, for
example, has brought tumultuous change,
and in some ways might have been managed
somewhat differently (a statement we might
yet make regarding electricity deregulation).
But the contribution of these market deregu-
lations to the long-term growth of output by
lowering the cost of doing business and
expanding the range of consumer choice is
undeniable. In essence, deregulation allowed
markets to reorganize those activities in order
to produce more and get more out of our
resources.
But beyond providing society with a system
for economic organization, markets are them-
selves a set of social relationships. Efficient
markets are premised on honest representa-
tions and the free flow of information. When
this assumption is violated, markets can pro-
duce undesirable results. When buyer and sell-
er lack the same information, for example,
the potential for exploitation exists: indeed,
some economists identify uneven information
as a cause of the persistence of poverty.15 The
consequences of the breakdown of informa-
tion flows and deviations from an underlying
culture of honesty are also seen in the effects
of the recent corporate reporting scandals.
The misstatement of corporate reports and
the underlying culture of corruption that
accompanied many of these misstatements led
investors to allocate investment funds on false
premises and left the economy worse off. 
All this suggests that markets require some
underlying regulatory structure to function
effectively. We will return to this topic in a
later section.
INVENT, INVEST, REORGANIZE:
THE PROCESS IN ACTION
When explained against the simple back-
drop of a ditch-digging economy, the way
invention, investment, and reorganization
lead to economic growth is easy to see. But in
the real world, the process occurs in an histor-
ical context and is filled with the details of the
moment — the specifics of the technology,
the form investment takes, the way the econo-
my is currently organized, or the specific
changes that occur. But when these details 
are stripped away, the underlying process can
again be seen.
Consider two examples from U.S. history.
One is the period of industrialization in the
late 19th and early 20th century, when large
industrial combines were being formed in
most of the day’s manufacturing industries 
A good example is steel. In the late 19th
century, there were many producers. But at
the turn of the century, about forty of them
were rolled up by Judge Gary and financed by
J. P. Morgan, to form the nation’s first billion
dollar corporation, U.S. Steel, of which Gary
became chief executive. 
U.S. Steel did not come into being simply
because Morgan and Gary were more avari-
cious or ruthless than any preceding business-
men (although their avariciousness and ruth-
lessness were no doubt formidable). Rather,
technologies, beginning with the Bessemer
furnace, had come into being, allowing much
more steel to be made in one location, and
requiring larger production volumes to justify
the investments. As more and more firms
leapt to embrace this technology and expand-
ed capacity, substantial overcapacity resulted.
This gave U.S. Steel’s founders their opportu-
nity. In essence, there was invention and
investment, but there needed to be reorgani-
zation before the benefits of more efficient
steel-making technology could be fully real-
ized. The result of that reorganization was
U.S. Steel, and subsequently, the other large,
integrated steel producers, who monopolized
10
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the industry for most of the following century. 
The creation of U.S. Steel was not without
problems. It raised the question of market
power and monopoly (indeed, this era gave
rise to the development of anti-trust law), of
workers’ safety and pay (although Judge Gary
was fairly progressive in these regards), and of
union representation (where he was not).
These issues reiterate a point made elsewhere
in this paper — that economic growth itself is
not the only goal, and that the failure to dis-
tribute that growth equitably may require a
policy response. But U.S. Steel was a good
example of how invention, investment, and
reorganization come together to grow the
economy. In fact, it is both a good example
and an ironic one, insofar as new technologies
for directly reducing steel from scrap metal
have given rise in recent decades to so-called
“minimills” (such as Nucor Steel) that have
reduced significantly the market share of the
“integrated” steel producers, such as U.S.
Steel. Thus, technological progress has dra-
matically and continually changed the struc-
ture of the steel industry.
A comparable example of the growth
process can be found in the current economy.
Digital technology is providing the economy
with a strong stream of inventions, the effects
of which cannot be overstated. For example,
when James Watt invented the steam engine
in the 18th century, he cut the price of
mechanical work in half. Today, the price of
information processing effectively is cut in
half every five years. 
As is obvious, those inventions are spread-
ing through the economy in the form of new
investment. The bursting of the technology
stock bubble has slowed the investment
process, but the shifting composition of invest-
ment underscores the importance of invest-
ment as a means of spreading new inventions
through the economy. As shown in Figure 2,
as recently as 1990, private investment in com-
puters and other information processing
equipment was only 15 percent of the econo-
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FIGURE 2
my’s new private investment in real terms. By
2001, however, that proportion had shifted to
35 percent.† Again, we think of investment 
as a way to accumulate wealth and to give 
workers more tools to do their jobs. But this
growing importance of information technolo-
gy investment demonstrates that investment is
the economy’s central means of disseminating
tools that embody new technology.
And, again, the gains from the new tech-
nology cannot be realized without reorganiza-
tion. One effect we associate with new infor-
mation technology is the downsizing of mid-
dle management inside large organizations.
These organizational information “pyramids”
were formed a century ago in order to man-
age the information flows associated with
large-scale production; General Motors was a
pioneer in creating this kind of organization.
But computers can now process, verify, and
share information far more cheaply than large
numbers of bureaucrats inside companies.
Thus, modern companies have adopted a
“flatter” and more “networked” organizational
chart, as information technology allows them
to get by with a smaller internal staff. The
“middle-management” layer of the corpora-
tion has become like the ditch-diggers con-
fronted with a backhoe.
Other less obvious but equally compelling
organizational changes in the economy have
also been triggered by information technolo-
gy. For example, U.S. manufacturing tradition-
ally had a very high level of vertical integra-
tion; an individual firm made its parts and
components as well as its finished products (as
did, for example, firms in the automobile and
computer industries). Why did that high level
of integration persist throughout American
industry? At root, it was because it was more
efficient for one company’s bureaucracy
(organizational “pyramid”) to coordinate
those various activities through memos and
planning meetings than a string of different
companies acting together, coordinated by
markets. But as the price of information pro-
cessing falls, it becomes easier for different
firms to coordinate their activities using com-
puter networks and video conferencing.
Today, automobile and computer companies
design, assemble, and sell their products, but
the components of those products — be they
transmissions or printed circuit boards — are
generally made elsewhere. Thus, the manufac-
turing sector has become far less integrated —
it’s now common for firms who supply each
other to share production information, design
specifications, and other information via infor-
mation technology networks. As a result, the
information revolution has allowed for more
specialization in the economy, and therefore
productivity, because the economy has reorga-
nized itself to accommodate it.16
Other inventions and periods in U.S. eco-
nomic history also display this pattern — be
they related to interchangeable parts and the
cotton gin, electricity and the electric motor,
or the current promise of biotechnology.
Inventions such as these have fed the growth
process and raised the U.S. standard of living.
And yet, U.S. economic history is usually
recalled in terms of other events, whether pol-
icy failures such as the Great Depression and
Smoot-Hawley tariffs, or successes such as the
rise of public education, the interstate high-
way system, and the Marshall Plan. If growth is
about innovation, investment, and reorganiza-
tion, how do these economic policy issues
relate to the growth process?
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† Strictly, these proportions cannot be thought-of as
“shares,” since they use chain-weighted, “real” dollar
values. The chain-weighted components of investment
do not necessarily add-up to total real investment.
Nevertheless, real values most accurately show the
increasing importance of information technology
investment at a time when the relative price of infor-
mation technology was falling rapidly. For further
information on the use of chain-weighted dollar 
values, see http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/
NIPAHelp.htm#Chain. 
Economic growth stems from society’s abil-
ity to invent, invest, and reorganize, a process
centered in the private sector. But at the same
time, a variety of other public policies influ-
ence the growth process, from fiscal and mon-
etary policies to policies governing trade, reg-
ulation, corporate governance, investments in
education, and the like. How do these policies
relate to the growth process? How can they
best be managed to promote it?
This chapter discusses policies such as:
sound macroeconomic policy; policies that
produce “openness,” such as trade, cross-bor-
der investment, and immigration; corporate
governance and financial market structure;
business “culture;” and public investments.
These policies cannot produce sustained,
long-term growth in the standard of living on
their own, but they can enable it, by allowing
society to use its assets wisely and positioning
the economy to capture the full benefits of
invention, investment, and reorganization. In
essence, these policies “set the stage” — they
create an environment that leads to better
technological change and investment (in
terms of both their level and composition)
and more appropriate organization, at the
level of both society and the individual firm.
The links between these policies and the
growth process will be discussed below.
These stage-setting policies take on even
greater significance in the modern economy
due to the importance of global economic
integration. In earlier times, the natural
resource and other endowments of individual
nations were more important in determining
what they produced and exported. The
English had wool and made cloth; the
Portuguese had grapes and made wine. These
resource endowments played a large and obvi-
ous role in determining the way these
economies produced, traded, and grew.
But as modern economies have evolved,
they have come to depend less on natural
resources (such as farm or energy produc-
tion) for their wealth. And a similar transition
is now underway regarding physical capital
itself. As Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan has famously noted, total econom-
ic output “weighs less” — it has fewer goods
and more services and intangibles, from
finance to software to professional services,
which are not inherently tied to a particular
climate or terrain.17
The decline in the importance of natural
resources, the rise in intangible assets and
products, and the international flows of infor-
mation and technology have changed the
nature of international exchange. Fueled by
virtually free sharing of information, compa-
nies around the world are capable of forming
relationships that allow them access to almost
any resource or technology, through joint ven-
tures, research consortia, out-sourcing or co-
production arrangements, mergers or market-
ing arrangements, electronic markets, or any
of a number of other relationships. While
national preferences still exist — capital, for
example, does not move across national
boundaries with the ease it does internally —
global production is being reshaped into a 
latticework of relationships that allows almost
any firm to secure access to almost any pro-
ductive resource.
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This development challenges our views of
trade and, more importantly, of growth. With
such enormous mobility of resources of all
kinds, how does a nation now find its role in
the international economy?
Certainly, differences do exist between
high-wage and low-wage countries, differences
that can readily be attributed to differences in
the abundance of labor, capital, human capi-
tal, and resulting worker productivity. But,
while very important for many low-income
developing countries, wage differences do not
explain large parts of the pattern of global
trade, especially among industrialized
economies. 
If most resources are mobile around the
world and, therefore, are available every-
where, then a nation’s economic success will
have more to do with how its business organi-
zations put those resources together. Anyone,
for example, can gain access to sugar, cocoa,
and milk on world commodity markets, but
only a few companies produce commercially
successful candy bars. The same is now true in
such products as computers, automobiles,
pharmaceuticals, and others, but in these
examples, instead of cocoa, milk, and sugar,
the inputs are components, engineering, and
technology. The question becomes: what are
the characteristics of an environment that
lead a nation’s firms to enjoy this success?
In one sense, there are few characteristics
of a nation’s environment that do not affect
this outcome. Consider, for example, the
delivery of health care. This is a fundamental
domestic policy issue for all the leading
economies. But reducing the great inefficien-
cies in health care delivery in the U.S. would
change our economic opportunities in impor-
tant ways. Given that health care accounts for
14 percent of GDP, an efficient system would
both improve the quality of care and free up
significant amounts of resources for other pro-
ductive uses.18 Insofar as most health care cov-
erage is provided by employers, reform would
lower business costs or raise employee com-
pensation. Viable reform would also make
workers less dependent for health coverage on
their ties to a specific workplace, and there-
fore allow greater labor force mobility. And
improvements in public health would allow
the workforce to be more productive. Thus, a
more efficient health care sector would lower
business costs and raise incomes, improve pro-
ductivity, and allow more mobility in the work-
force (as fewer people remained in specific
jobs solely to obtain benefits). In short, all of
these effects would help to create an environ-
ment in which firms could better invent,
invest, and reorganize. A comparable example
of a “domestic” policy with broad-ranging
effects is Japanese land use policy (zoning),
which affects the structure of the retail indus-
try and, in turn, the penetration of foreign
goods. 
Thus, the level of integration in the world
is such that there are few if any truly “domes-
tic” policies in the world. In fact, given the
reality that trade is a “positive sum” game —
that it makes both countries better off — sig-
nificant policy reform in one nation has the
potential to lead to economic gains around
the world.
With that caution expressed, there are sev-
eral realms of economic policy that are partic-
ularly important in “setting the stage” for
growth, that is, in creating an environment in
which firms can best invent, invest, and reor-
ganize. These include: macroeconomic policy,
economic “openness,” corporate governance
and the quality of capital markets, culture,
and public investment.
MACROECONOMIC POLICY
Fiscal policy moved straightforwardly into
the area of economic “stage-setting” with the
advent of John Maynard Keynes and the subse-
quent post-war view that government could
“fine tune” the economy’s cycles, or as the late
Arthur Okun put it, that the economy’s down-
turns were more like plane crashes than hurri-
canes — fundamentally preventable.19 Much
has occurred to change this view, including the
OPEC price shocks, a finer understanding of
the role of expectations, and the apparent
inability of the political system to carry out
these policies in a timely and efficient manner.
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Fiscal policy, in particular, has been an ineffec-
tive tool for “fine-tuning” short-term fluctua-
tions and has instead become an important
determinant of long-term growth, as will be dis-
cussed below. Economists have waged similar
theoretical debates over the efficacy of mone-
tary policy, but it has nonetheless proved an
effective (albeit rather blunt) tool in practice.
Macroeconomic policy — primarily fiscal
policy — affects long-term growth in many
ways. One of these is the phenomenon of
“crowding out.” In an economy unaffected 
by the rest of the world, government borrow-
ing to finance deficits will divert capital from
other uses, thus “crowding out” private invest-
ment. If the economy is more open, then it
can borrow from abroad to make up the 
difference, but this creates obligations to 
foreigners that must be serviced from future
income. This not only mortgages future
income, but it creates a new source of poten-
tial instability in international capital flows.
Second, when foreigners buy U.S. assets, they
have to buy dollars to get them. This “bids up”
the dollar relative to other currencies (the
exchange rate). This harms U.S. exports,
which are the very industries in which the U.S.
has an international advantage. Thus, by
inhibiting exports, deficits restructure the
economy towards untraded, and generally less
productive, goods and services — less high-
tech output, more haircuts and restaurants.
As Figure 3 illustrates, recent experience
shows that private investment in the economy
has moved in line with federal budget deficits, 
or reductions thereof. But some of this 
correlation is no doubt due to the larger
macroeconomic backdrop of the period,
which affects both.
No discussion of deficits can be divorced
“The federal government should adopt an
investment-oriented federal budget and
investment-oriented deficit reduction 
program that will build capital…and
enhance productivity growth.” 
SOURCE: Committee for Economic Development,
Growth with Opportunity (New York, NY: Committee for
Economic Development, 1997), p. 13.
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from a discussion of tax policy. Recent tax 
cuts have changed the long-term direction of
fiscal policy, particularly when coupled with
likely long-term spending increases for nation-
al and homeland security. These cuts are often
defended as part of a “pro-growth” strategy in
which lower tax rates, by encouraging individu-
als to provide more labor, increase future eco-
nomic capacity and incomes by enough to off-
set the anti-growth effects of “crowding out.” 
However, the available evidence does not
support this view. While some “second earn-
ers” such as married women, and low-income
single workers, appear to seek jobs or work
longer hours at lower tax rates, economists
find little such “elasticity” in labor supply
among male heads of households or middle-
to-high income single workers.20 As a result,
any effect on total labor supply is likely to be
modest and too small to offset the anti-growth
effects of the larger deficits associated with the
tax cuts.21 Of course, tax cuts, like spending
increases, may provide a short-term boost to
the economy by raising short-term demand
for goods and services, but such demand
increases do not enhance long-term growth.
Monetary policy has been more effective
when used to spur or restrain economic activi-
ty (and thereby employment and inflation) by
changing demand in the short-term, when
compared to fiscal policy. In the longer term,
however, monetary policy’s primary task is to
find the fastest rate of growth consistent with
price stability. Inflation is a debilitating force
for economic growth. When inflation or the
expectations of it are strong enough to affect
business thinking, it distracts business from
the activities — such as invention and invest-
ment — that lead to growth. The same can be
said for deflation, a steady decline in prices,
which can have just as pernicious an effect. 
But beyond the broad sweep of monetary
and fiscal policy, the details can also be impor-
tant. The composition of government spend-
ing can also have important consequences.
Policies at cross purposes will waste resources,
as do, for example, agricultural policies that
encourage overproduction for government
storage that exist side-by-side with export pro-
motions. Alternatively, the composition of
expenditures determines a variety of direct
incentives. CED has expressed its concerns
that federal spending, for example, is tilted
towards current consumption (for example,
Social Security) and away from investment in
both its private and public forms.22 Similarly,
tax incentives for homeownership have, over
time, given us a relatively larger residential
stock and smaller productive stock of capital
than other advanced nations and do not dis-
tinguish between owner-occupied homes that
stabilize neighborhoods versus beach homes
and mansionized residences.23
Finally, direct incentives can stimulate parts
of the growth process, as do incentives for
research and development or for investment.
But these must be designed carefully in order
to avoid conveying direct and deadweight sub-
sidies to activities that would have occurred in
the private sector regardless.24
OPENNESS 
If the global economy offers any producer
access to (almost) all of the world’s productive
resources, and if economic success depends
on assembling those resources in order to add
value to them, then an economy’s openness
must be a fundamental determinant of its
standard of living. 
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“Changes in the composition of Federal
expenditures have encouraged private 
consumption and reduced public invest-
ments. The most conspicuous shift in
spending priorities has been the rapid
expansion of transfer payments in entitle-
ment programs… go[ing] predominantly 
to middle- and higher-income rather than
poor beneficiaries.”
SOURCE: Committee for Economic Development,
Restoring Prosperity: Budget Choices for Economic 
Growth (New York, NY: Committee for Economic
Development, 1992), p. 33.
Of course, “openness,” over the long sweep
of history, has sometimes meant precisely the
reverse to many peoples — colonialism,
oppression, and enslavement. But even in dis-
tant historical periods, openness based on
mutual benefit and voluntary exchange has
been a catalyzing force in producing wealth
and betterment. Trade helped to make
Venice, Portugal, and then Holland the most
advanced economies of the seventeenth cen-
tury. Moreover, expanded trade interacted
with technological progress, investment, and
organization, as awareness of distant opportu-
nities led these societies to improve their ship-
building, banking and finance, and other
technologies, to invest in these opportunities,
and to adopt new forms of organizations
(such as the first banks, or such early public
stock companies as the Dutch East India
Company), all of which raised the standards
of living of their societies dramatically.
CED’s historical commitment to open bor-
ders is based on its understanding of trade’s
compelling benefits. These benefits are tradi-
tionally expressed in terms of a nation’s “com-
parative advantage,” that is, its ability to find
some set of activities it performs relatively
(when compared to other activities) better
than do other nations. This relative ability
allows every country, however unproductive in
absolute terms, to specialize in something
and, in turn, improves global welfare.
Moreover, trade allows a nation’s firms to
develop specializations that reflect its compe-
tencies, and to avoid recreating within its
boundaries what can already be purchased,
and on better terms, elsewhere in the world.
In the modern context, however, “open-
ness” means more than simple trade. It means
accessibility to capital and foreign investment,
to technology, and to human resources via
immigration. 
Foreign direct investment is the dominant
manner in which resources are transferred to
the developing world.25 While the U.S. and
Europe are the world’s major recipients of for-
eign direct investment, the impact of foreign
investment is greater in the developing world.
Beyond the traditional benefits of investment
— an expanded stock of productive capital
and enhanced embodied technology — for-
eign investment adds to the level of competi-
tion within an economy, increasing the incen-
tives firms have to innovate and become more
productive. It may also deliver new ideas
regarding organization, consumer satisfaction,
or other operating precepts to the local labor
force. Again, we associate this phenomenon
with direct investment in the developing
world, but it holds true in advanced countries
such as the U.S., where foreign firms have
been important innovators in such industries
as automobiles or electronics. 
Openness to investment often equates to
openness to technology, since investment
often conveys new technology. But the bene-
fits of openness in technology can also be
seen in failed attempts to substitute domestic
efforts for abilities that already exist else-
where. Two noteworthy failures in this regard
were Plan Calcul, a French government pro-
gram to develop a French mainframe comput-
ing alternative to leading American firms
(such as IBM) in the 1960s, and the Japanese
Fifth Generation Computing Program, in
which the Japanese government and comput-
ing industry banded together to develop a
Japanese computer operating system to
replace MS-DOS and Unix in the 1980s. In
both cases, policy attempted to create eco-
nomic activity where the private sector had
shown no innate ability to outperform foreign
competitors. Not only did both of these efforts
fail, but they distracted their domestic indus-
tries from finding activities at which they had
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“International trade and investment
improve global economic welfare through
specialization, increased competition,
economies of scale, and smoother economic
adjustment.” 
SOURCE: Committee for Economic Development, From
Protest to Progress: Addressing Labor and Environmental
Conditions Through Freer Trade (New York, NY:
Committee for Economic Development, 2001), p. 1.
a sustainable advantage. With its strength in
computer components and its ideographic
language, one would expect Japan to be a
leader in computer graphics. In fact, it isn’t.
One reason may be the policy-led distractions
associated with reinventing what had already
been accomplished elsewhere in the world,
and the commensurate waste of time and
resources.
As the world’s economy becomes more
integrated, the benefits of openness extend to
cross-border movements of labor as well.
Census data from 2000 reveal that the contri-
bution of foreign workers — both legal and
undocumented — may have been far more
substantial than at first thought.26 With the
costs of transportation falling around the
world, workers have the ability to travel to vir-
tually any place and apply their skills. Influxes
of foreign workers may now become a hall-
mark of the advanced economies, particularly
in the United States, where the education sys-
tem is producing inadequate quantities of sci-
entists and engineers. As of 1999, fully 41 per-
cent of new doctoral degrees in science, math-
ematics, and engineering given in the U.S.
were being awarded to foreigners.27 Without
these workers, the U.S. economy would be
unable to realize its innovative potential.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
THE QUALITY OF THE MARKETS
As discussed earlier, economists tend 
to focus on markets as a process, that is, a 
technique for allocating resources that puts
them to the best use. But markets are, at their
core, a set of social relationships, in that they
define the way people will interact and what
they may reasonably expect of each other.
When markets “work” — when they do their
resource allocation job well — it is because
those relationships work. 
The recent corporate reporting scandals
are an excellent example of the importance 
of this standard.  Perhaps the most important
market in the economy is the capital market,
the market for funds used by businesses at all
stages of development, whether in the form 
of stocks, bonds, loans, or more speculative
forms, such as private equity, venture capital,
or start-up money. The corporate reporting
scandals (and the associated malfeasances of
some Boards of Directors) were an affront to
the economy because they demonstrated that
investors could not rely on the information
they received, whether through obfuscation 
or outright fraud. 
Like the thirteenth chime of a clock, 
the presence of some misinformation in a
market casts doubt on all the other informa-
tion provided to market participants. This 
presents markets with a new and unanticipat-
ed source of risk; the effect of this risk was 
evident in the precipitous declines in the
value of stocks and resulting slowdown of 
economic activity. While much or most of 
the financial information provided by 
many or most firms was not corrupted, the
faith investors had in the information of 
each particular firm was suddenly called 
into question. Thus, the presence of some
misinformation and the failure of some
market participants to uphold agreed-upon
standards of behavior (even if those 
standards are imposed externally by 
regulation and the threat of litigation) 
poses a risk for all concerned. The losses
experienced by the shareholders of Enron,
Worldcom, or other such companies, while
grievous, are small in comparison to the 
larger, economy-wide losses that occur 
when the “quality” of markets is impaired.
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“As the impending long-term national labor
shortage approaches and the relative pro-
ductivity and importance of skilled workers
continues to grow, immigration will become
increasingly important as one means of
addressing economic change.” 
SOURCE: Committee for Economic Development,
Reforming Immigration: Helping Meet America’s Need for a
Skilled Workforce (New York, NY: Committee for
Economic Development, 2001), p. 38. 
The severity of the corporate reporting 
scandals can be seen in this paradox: while
the conduct of corporate management
impaired markets, it is markets themselves
that are supposed to discipline the behavior of
corporate management. The U.S. (or more
generally, countries that subscribe to the
“Anglo-American model”) has an “agency
economy,” that is, an economy in which cor-
porate managements act as agents for their
shareholders. Shareholders, in turn, discipline
corporate managers, both directly (in theory)
through their ability to select them, and indi-
rectly, by evaluating their performance
through buying and selling their shares. The
intent of this system — a “contestable market
for corporate control” — is to make corporate
managers willing and responsive agents for
their stockholders. When they are such
agents, corporate managers are most likely to
engage in vigorous competition — inventing,
investing, and reorganizing their firms. This 
is the growth process as it is experienced at
the firm level. But the system breaks down if 
managerial behavior is corrupt, if Boards of
Directors are captive, or if stockholder 
vigilance is lax, which creates a need for 
regulation and its enforcement.
A closely-related subject is the structure of
capital markets. The purpose of capital mar-
kets is to direct funds towards the most
promising activities in the economy, whether
to the largest corporations or the smallest
start-ups.  But this task can be accomplished
in any number of ways. In Japan, for example,
in most critical sectors, capital is allocated
largely through interconnected families of
companies; in continental Europe, banks fre-
quently provide capital and play the role of
stockholders and managers. Both systems have
been justified in the past on the basis of the
farsightedness they allow in corporate man-
agement, as keiretsu members or banks are
capable of looking to the long-term when for-
mulating investment plans.
The implicit criticism of the American sys-
tem — that a free market for corporate con-
trol is susceptible to speculative frenzies,
myopia, churning, and other counterproduc-
tive tendencies — has some merit. The U.S.
endured a sizable bubble in the late 1990s,
although its causes may not be wholly related
to the failure of its agency-based economy; the
recent collapse of the telecom sector in the
U.S. was paralleled in the other industrialized
regions, regardless of institutional features.
Thus, bubbles are not unknown to other
countries — in the Japanese case, they are
spectacularly well known — and their
economies have demonstrated neither the
growth record nor the history of corporate
profitability the American system has shown. 
Governments influence the characteristics
of their economies’ systems of governance
and capital allocation through the conduct of
regulation and law and, ultimately, by permit-
ting the prospect of litigation. Granted, regu-
lation is an imprecise policy instrument with
often-unintended consequences. Regulations,
for example, requiring independent boards of
directors and stipulating their behavior can
bolster the disciplining role of boards, but can
also make it difficult to recruit new board
members, or make the corporate form too
expensive for middle-size companies.
Similarly, regulations governing accounting
standards or the ways stock exchanges relate
to their traders may meet specific domestic
objectives, but fail to conform to international
norms and create other disadvantages. But
these problems are not reasons to avoid need-
ed regulation. Instead, when regulatory poli-
cies are vital to assure the proper functioning
of markets, they must continually be reviewed
to make sure they are most consistent with 
the long-term growth process of invention,
investment, and reorganization.  
CULTURE AS AN 
ECONOMIC ASSET 
Markets serve an economic purpose, but
are a social phenomenon; thus, culture will
affect them. And while economists traditional-
ly have not been predisposed to consider 
culture as an economic phenomenon, 
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there is now a growing recognition that it 
is important, as evidenced by the work of
David Landes and others.28
Culture can be defined as a set of values
and beliefs shared widely in society. America’s
cultural predisposition towards individualism
has played a central role in its historical devel-
opment. It has fostered an environment in
which inventors and investors anticipate
rewards and entrepreneurs are predisposed 
to take risk. 
Much of the invention that has powered
American growth has its roots in this culture.
From Eli Whitney to Edison and the Wright
brothers to Xerox and Hewlett-Packard,
American technological progress has strong
roots in this individualism. The same culture
assigns individual investors responsibility for
their decisions and rewards them with gains
and losses, which underpins the agency 
economy and the contestable market for 
corporate control.
That is not to argue that America’s culture
is the only possible culture consistent with
economic progress. But it does argue that cul-
ture and economic organization play a strong
role in determining how resources are used,
and therefore how growth occurs. Critics have
raised important concerns about the U.S. cul-
ture of individualism, from its unwillingness to
purchase adequate public goods (such as edu-
cation or public health), its short-sightedness
(as witnessed in a low savings rate or willing-
ness to tolerate environmental damage, or the
potential for whipsaws or “bubbles” in its mar-
kets), or its countenance of inequality. 
But the same culture offers compelling
strengths. Perhaps the proof of this proposi-
tion lies in comparing the U.S. to other
advanced economies. Japan and continental
Europe, with cultures more oriented towards
consensus and collective action, have been
unable to develop the new businesses needed
to reorganize society around new technolo-
gies; where are the European or Japanese
Microsofts and Dells? When Japan was an 
economic power in the 1980s, its strengths
came from its very integrated and closely-held
system. Japan came to dominate the produc-
tion of fax machines, for example, because its
“industrial families” made all of the necessary
parts and were able to plan, as a group, to
absorb their capacity with this new produc-
tion. The tax system also favored this plan,
since personal income was taxed at a very
high rate while capital gains were taxed at a
very low one, leading firms to reinvest as
much of their available profit as possible
rather than distribute it. Thus, the culture,
corporate structure, and tax environment
combined to induce the Japanese to produce
fax machines, even though, on the whole,
they probably made no money doing so.
A further aspect of culture that relates to
economic growth is the political system. In the
absence of open political competition, a self-
perpetuating political establishment is prone
to being captured by specific interests whose
interests are not served by change.29 The cur-
rent economic crisis in Japan provides ample
demonstration of the paralysis that can occur
when entrenched interests oppose policy
changes needed to restore growth.
CED has been a champion of political
reform, from campaign finance reform to the
improved selection of judges. It does so
because of a long-standing commitment to an
improved democracy. But the same political
reforms have economic consequences — they
create a more open political system, which
makes it more difficult for individual interests 
20
HOW ECONOMIES GROW
“A vibrant economy and well functioning
business system will not remain viable in an
environment of real or perceived corrup-
tion…. If public policy decisions are made
— or appear to be made — on the basis of
political contributions, not only will policy
be suspect, but its uncertain and arbitrary
character will make business planning less
effective and the economy less productive.”
SOURCE: Committee for Economic Development,
Investing in the People’s Business: A Business Proposal for
Campaign Finance Reform (New York, NY: Committee for
Economic Development, 1999), p. 1.
to capture the policy-making apparatus and
slow the growth process.
Thus, much of the explanation for the way
economic activity takes place in any country
has to do with governance, finance, and tax
policy, but culture plays an important role as
well, if only because it influences these other
factors.
PUBLIC INVESTMENT
A final set of government policies worthy
of mention is public investments. These are
investments that private actors could not rea-
sonably be expected to perform, either
because their benefits would be impossible to
appropriate fully (for example, basic
research), because they have large start-up
costs and would require some element of
monopoly to recoup the investment (e.g.,
roads and other public infrastructure), or
because they are viewed as both a precondi-
tion to private economic activity or as a social
right (public education, the legal system,
police and fire protection).
Education and infrastructure are frequent-
ly noted as essential elements of the growth
process, and CED has frequently commented
on these.30
As CED’s previous work demonstrates,
“more” public investments do not always
mean “better.” While more spending on edu-
cation in some instances — particularly on
pre-school programs — might well deliver 
sizable benefits, improving the accountability
for educational results is also necessary, in
CED’s view.31 Similarly, more spending on
infrastructure could facilitate growth, but also
ignores the need to manage what we now
operate effectively, though such policies as
pricing roads or airports to reduce the
demand for them at peak hours or generally
to charge appropriate user fees. 
Public investments such as these have a
variety of rationales, over and above their con-
tribution to growth. Schools are a vehicle for
social mobility. Mass transit potentially obvi-
ates pollution and allows low-income workers
to reach places of employment. Research and
development allows those who use innovations
to benefit in ways that do not accrue to the
innovator. While these benefits can be com-
pelling, they need to be demonstrated con-
cretely to justify the investments that create
them. 
UNRESOLVED ISSUES
A growing economy helps to create a 
better society, but it does not lead to a perfect
one. Specifically, there are economic issues
growth alone does not resolve. Two of these
are of immediate concern here: equity and
distributional considerations; and environ-
mental preservation and more generally,
sustainable development.
The “right” level of equality or inequality is
subjective and ultimately a matter of political
judgment. To some extent, inequality and
growth are inseparable. Growth itself is an act
of change and displacement, as new activities
supplant old ones, and therefore changes the
distribution of societal rewards. Moreover, so
long as incentives are the primary reason for
economic behavior, some degree of inequality
would appear necessary. But we nonetheless
believe that the recent increase in inequality
in our society needs to be scrutinized.
CED’s historical approach has been not to
focus on the degree of inequality as an out-
come in its own right, but to address the spe-
cific needs of populations in poverty, with an
emphasis on identifying the tools necessary to
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“Productive economic activity depends
upon private and public investment….
Effectively chosen and designed public
investment in physical capital, R&D, and
human capital (such as education and train-
ing) are essential to economic growth, as
they have been throughout our history.”
SOURCE: Committee for Economic Development,
Growth with Opportunity (New York, NY: Committee for
Economic Development, 1997), p. 14.
provide them with the skills and means to
help them function in the labor market.32 This
involves training, job search, transportation,
health care, and other instruments to facilitate
their becoming employable and productive
enough to earn an adequate living. Regardless
of one’s views of the “correct” level of equality
in society, this is a needed first step.
A final general problem concerns environ-
mental issues, or more generally, “sustainabili-
ty.” CED has stressed its commitment to effec-
tive regulation and, in particular, regulation
that specifies outcomes such as clean water
and air but leaves open the means to achieve
them.33
But, as was the case for corporate gover-
nance, the need to temper the strategy of reg-
ulation does not mean regulation should not
exist. Indeed, regulation may be required
when markets fail to perform their functions
effectively, either because they do not provide
the right signals or because people respond to
them incorrectly.
A good example of a failure to provide
“the right signals” is pollution. An air polluter
imposes costs on others, through illness, prop-
erty loss, and other injuries. But the polluter,
absent regulation, has no incentive to mitigate
this damage. Ideally, regulators would have
the ability to establish the “right price” for pol-
lution and force polluters to pay that price for 
their emissions. This ideal, however, is hard to
implement in practice: the “true” value of pol-
lution or, more generally, “external effects” is
often uncertain; many of the benefits (such as
species diversity or the preservation of scenic
wilderness) may be difficult to assess or to
turn into monetary values; monitoring emis-
sions or administering the most theoretically
efficient policy may pose difficulties or costs;
or there may be benefits to coordinating the
societal response through such devices as stan-
dards, information programs, technological
programs, or other devices. But just as unabat-
ed pollution imposes costs that impede
growth, so can regulation that is inflexible or
poorly targeted.
Some observers believe that resource
scarcities will ultimately force limits on the
growth process. In fact, history has shown the
opposite to be true. Society has substituted for
scarce resources by increasing its stock of
knowledge and finding new means for accom-
plishing the same ends, that is, by inventing
and investing. There are some natural
resources — for example, particular biological
species — that should be preserved in the
interest of ecological balance and values and
those species’ potential effect on human wel-
fare. Similarly, the deforestation of Africa
resulting from the use of wood as fuel is a
matter of markets failing rather than working. 
But the fact of scarcity in and of itself is not
a reason to anticipate slower growth nor to
put arbitrary limits on consumption. Oil poses
environmental and security risks — these risks
ought to be “priced” — meaning a value
established for them — and duly regulated.
But were oil environmentally benign and
more abundant domestically, its scarcity alone
would not merit it special treatment.
Economists have substantial faith that, in
these cases, markets can foresee these geologi-
cal or other “natural” limits and correct for
them on their own, by developing alternatives
in anticipation of future price increases. The
true “limits to growth” are about limits on
invention, investment, and reorganization —
not about resource scarcity. 
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“The American people overwhelmingly —
and correctly — believe that government
regulation is needed to achieve many impor-
tant economic and social goals. Regulations
spring directly from the desire for clean air,
drinkable water, reliable financial markets,
improved medicines, and competitive indus-
tries…. Nevertheless, the current regulatory 
system produces too few benefits at exces-
sive cost.”
SOURCE: Committee for Economic Development,
Modernizing Government Regulation: The Need for Action
(New York, NY: Committee for Economic Development,
1998), p. 3. 
American society is premised on continu-
ing economic growth. But long-term econom-
ic growth itself is rarely the explicit object of
policy. Growth, across time and across soci-
eties, inevitably is the product of three com-
pelling factors — invention (generating new
ideas), investment (putting those ideas into
practice), and social reorganization (allowing
the full ramifications of those ideas to take
effect).
The extent to which this growth process
will take place also depends on the environ-
ment within which it occurs. This environ-
ment includes among other components, a
pro-savings fiscal policy, a sound monetary
policy, an open international environment,
strong corporate governance, rational public
investment (particularly in education), and an
honest political system. These “set the stage”
for growth by allowing invention, investment,
and reorganization to flourish.
These policies are often thankless political-
ly — they sometimes require sacrifices or
occur at the expense of a particular group’s
interest. But CED, both over the 60 years of its
existence and into the future, will continue to
be a “voice for growth” that brings this central
economic issue to the public debate.
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For 60 years, the Committee for Economic
Development has been a respected influence
on the formation of business and public policy.
CED is devoted to these two objectives:
To develop, through objective research and
informed discussion, findings and recommenda-tions
for private and public policy that will contribute to
preserving and strengthening our free society, achiev-
ing steady economic growth at high employment and
reasonably stable prices, increasing productivity and
living standards, providing greater and more equal
opportunity for every citizen, and improving the
quality of life for all. 
To bring about increasing understanding by pre-
sent and future leaders in business, government, and
education, and among concerned citizens, of the
importance of these objectives and the ways in which
they can be achieved. 
CED’s work is supported by private volun-
tary contributions from business and industry,
foundations, and individuals. It is indepen-
dent, nonprofit, nonpartisan, and nonpolitical.
Through this business-academic partner-
ship, CED endeavors to develop policy state-
ments and other research materials that com-
mend themselves as guides to public and busi-
ness policy; that can be used as texts in college
economics and political science courses and in
management training courses; that will be con-
sidered and discussed by newspaper and maga-
zine editors, columnists, and commentators;
and that are distributed abroad to promote bet-
ter understanding of the American economic
system.
CED believes that by enabling business lead-
ers to demonstrate constructively their concern
for the general welfare, it is helping business to
earn and maintain the national and communi-
ty respect essential to the successful function-
ing of the free enterprise capitalist system.
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